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DOMINIC J. O’MEARA 
The political thought explicitly or implicitly present in Michael Psellos’ 
historical masterpiece, the Chronographia, has attracted the attention of 
modern readers and given rise to studies using diverse methods and reaching 
diverse results.1 In general, however, this has been done without taking 
much account of the large body of texts produced by Psellos in relation to 
his teaching activities as a philosopher, with one notable exception: the 
autobiographical section in the Chronographia (VI 36ff.) where Psellos 
presents his philosophical education and interests, a passage evidently con-
nected with Psellos’ own philosophical work. The absence of research com-
paring the political thought of the Chronographia with what might be found 
in Psellos’ philosophical works has the disadvantage of giving the impres-
sion of a double personality in Psellos: the political thinker and actor of the 
Chronographia and the teacher in the philosophical works. There is also the 
danger that we may deprive ourselves of means allowing us better to under-
stand passages in the Chronographia involving fairly technical concepts and 
theoretical constructs which find fuller expression in the philosophical 
works, with the result that we may fail to grasp, or even misinterpret, 
Psellos’ views in the Chronographia. 
One reason for this situation is the long-standing absence of critical edi-
tions of Psellos’ philosophical works, a problem which is now slowly being 
resolved. A further reason may be that historians might be tempted to think 
sometimes (may Clio forgive my rudeness!) that they can adequately dis-
cuss philosophers of the past without having a serious grasp of their phi-
losophy. Perhaps the principal reason, however, is the feeling that the 
Psellos we find in the Chronographia is a real, interesting, even original 
thinker, whereas the Psellos of the philosophical works is an anthologist, an 
excerptor making patchworks out of ancient Greek philosophical texts, just 
the type which Byzantines were long supposed to exemplify and from which 
modern research wishes to save them. Yet the judgment dismissing Psellos’ 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Gadolin (1970); Kaldellis (1999). The latter book stimulated my interest 
in this subject, which led me however to different conclusions. 
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philosophical work as patchwork can be shown to be inadequate.2 One 
should also consider that Psellos had a deep knowledge of the Greek phi-
losophical tradition, a knowledge more extensive than ours could ever be, a 
tradition in which he was steeped and in which he situated himself. It is pre-
cisely in relation to this tradition that we can reach a better understanding of 
Psellos’ ideas and a more accurate view of his particularity. 
In the following pages I would like to propose some elements of a study 
of the political thought of the Chronographia read in relation to comparable 
ideas in Psellos’ philosophical works with the purpose of connecting these 
two facets of Psellos’ mind, hoping thereby to reach a better understanding 
of Psellos’ thought in the Chronographia and of its relation to the political 
philosophy of antiquity. In this article some examples of such comparative 
work can be proposed, not of course a complete examination. 
 
I 
Perhaps a beginning might be made with a passage in the Chronographia 
(VI a 8) where Psellos provides a characterization both of the different con-
ditions (καταστάσεις) of human souls and of their ‘lots’ (µερίδες) in rela-
tion to these conditions. We might say that what is involved is both the 
metaphysical and the ethical dimensions of human existence. Psellos distin-
guishes between two conditions of the soul, between soul taken by itself, 
living by itself separate from body, and soul as taken with the body, living 
with the body. The latter condition involves two possible ‘lots’: that of a 
soul which gives itself to the passions of the body, and that of a soul which 
avoids this, maintaining a moderate, intermediate position between the 
lower lot and the higher, that of soul living separately from the body. This 
higher lot of soul is described as ‘divine’, whereas the two lots of soul living 
with the body are identified as that of the ‘political’ man (πολιτικός … ἄν-
θρωπος), with regard to the moderate position, and as that of the pleasure-
loving life (ἀπολαυστικός; φιλήδονος), with regard to the soul given to the 
passions. The description of the two lower lots already involves ethical 
ideas to which we will soon return. 
Psellos’ distinction between three types of lives lived by souls may re-
mind us of the three lives distinguished by Aristotle at the beginning of his 
Nicomachean Ethics (I 5, 1095b17–19): the life of pleasure, the political and 
the theoretical (or contemplative) life. However, Psellos’ distinction is based 
                                                           
2 See O’Meara (1998); Ierodiakonou (2002b). Duffy (2002) shows what an exceptional 
figure Psellos was in the context of Byzantine philosophy. 
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on a metaphysical division between two conditions of soul, soul living sepa-
rate from the body and soul living with the body, which does not seem par-
ticularly Aristotelian. The division between the two conditions of the soul in 
the passage of the Chronographia can be found elsewhere in Psellos’ works, 
for example in his letters, where the condition of soul living with the body is 
described as ‘human’ and that of soul living separately as ‘divine’, and 
where Psellos situates himself in the middle,3 that which he describes in the 
Chronographia as the lot of the ‘political’ man. In a short text On the Soul, 
Psellos presents the distinction between soul taken by itself and soul as 
taken in relation to the body in a way which recalls his Neoplatonic sources, 
in particular Plotinus’ insistence on the need for soul to see itself by itself, 
separate from the body, where it discovers its divine nature, as compared to 
soul’s view of itself as related to the body.4 In the Neoplatonic philosophy 
of late antiquity, ‘man’ is defined as soul using the body as instrument and 
‘we’ are identified with the soul, a doctrine also found by Psellos as attrib-
uted to Plato in Nemesius5 and mentioned in Psellos’ philosophical hand-
book, the De omnifaria doctrina, the more extensive versions of which he 
dedicated to the emperor Michael VII.6 
According to this theory, then, we live, as souls separate from bodies, a 
divine condition, or, as souls living with the body, a human condition. These 
differing conditions involve differing ethical dispositions and actions, 
which, as the passage in the Chronographia makes clear, may be morally 
appropriate or not. In particular, the human condition may be directed to the 
life of the passions, a pleasure-loving life, or may be characterized by mod-
eration, the life of the ‘political’ man. It is clear that it is this moderate life 
that Psellos endorses as regards the human condition, that of soul taken in 
relation to the body. The term ‘political’ and the expression ‘political man’, 
as used by Psellos here, should probably not be taken in a modern sense, but 
in a moral sense as indicating a virtuous disposition in human life charac-
terized by moderation and contrasting with the vice of a life given to the 
passions. The appropriate moral sense can be found in the context of a con-
ception of ‘political’ virtue which is mentioned in an earlier passage in the 
Chronographia (VI 44.6–8), where ‘ethical’ virtue, ‘political’ virtue and a 
virtue even higher than these, reaching to the paradigmatic, are contrasted 
with the ‘natural’ virtue (or its opposed vice) which we have from birth. The 
                                                           
3 Letters 30 and 35 quoted by Jenkins (2006: 143–44). 
4 Phil. min. II 1, 1.1–2 and 17–23. See Plotinus, Enn. 4.7, 10.7ff. 
5 Phil. min. II 12, 23.21–24; Epist. ad Cerul. 32–33; see Plato, Alcib. 129e ff. and O’Meara 
(2003: 48). 
6 De omn. doct. 31.11–14; 33.2–3 and 8–14. 
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reader of Psellos’ De omnifaria doctrina will recognize in this passage the 
presence of the theory of a hierarchy of the virtues (natural, ethical, politi-
cal, paradigmatic, and so on) which Psellos explains at length in the hand-
book’s chapters on the virtues (66–81), which he describes elsewhere in his 
philosophical works (Phil. min. II 32) and which, no doubt under Psellos’ 
influence, reappears in John Italos, Eustratios of Nicaea and Michael of 
Ephesus.7 Let us then turn to the De omnifaria doctrina, where we find more 
information about what the virtue of the ‘political’ man, ‘political’ virtue, is. 
 
II 
We note first that the hierarchy of virtues follows the (metaphysical) divi-
sion discussed above between soul in itself and soul in relation to body: 
There are three orders of the virtues. For some of them order the human, that is soul 
with the body; some of them purify the soul from the body and turn it to itself, virtues 
which are called ‘purificatory’; some of them occupy completely the purified soul with 
the contemplation of intelligible realities, those called ‘theoretical’ and ‘intellective’ 
(De omn. doct. 66.1–7). 
The order of virtues not given a name here, those of the human, of soul re-
lated to the body, are named in a later section (69.6–7) as the four ‘political’ 
virtues of Plato which order human life (πολιτευόµενον ἄνθρωπον). 
Psellos is thinking of the four cardinal virtues defined by Plato at the end of 
Republic Book 4 and which concern good ordering of the functions both of 
the inner ‘republic’ of the soul and of the outer republic, Plato’s good city-
state. The term ‘political’ is used for these virtues by Plotinus in his treatise 
on the virtues (Enn. 1.2, 1.16) in a way which suggests that he is thinking of 
the inner ‘republic’, the ordering of soul in its life in relation to the body, 
whereas Porphyry, in his version of the Plotinian theory in the Sentences, 
refers to relations within a human community, an outer republic (32.6–8), a 
text copied by Psellos in De omnifaria doctrina section 70, where these 
‘political’ virtues are introduced as ordering the ‘phenomenal’ man, i.e. man 
as soul living in the world of sensible appearances.8 Elsewhere, in an inter-
pretation of a passage in Synesius,9 Psellos indicates that the ‘political’ vir-
tues of the Greek sages are named by ‘us’ the ‘practical’ virtues and he then 
                                                           
7 John Italos, Quaest. quod. 87ff.; for Eustratios, see O’Meara (2004: 113) and 
Papamanolakis (2007), for Michael of Ephesus, see O’Meara (2008: 48). 
8 For the expression ‘phenomenal man’, see Proclus, In Alcib. 25.3–6; In Tim. 1, 16.16; 
117.1–2. For the expression ‘political man’ as used in connection with the concept of 
‘political’ virtue in Neoplatonism, see O’Meara (2003: 44; 48; 57). 
9 Phil. min. II 32, 109.14–15. 
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provides a fairly extensive version of Porphyry’s chapter on the virtues in 
the Sentences. 
If section 66 of De omnifaria doctrina mentions three orders in the hier-
archy of virtues, section 69 mentions four, whereas section 67 gives a yet 
more extensive list including six orders, virtues which are ‘natural’, ‘ethi-
cal’, ‘political’, ‘purificatory’, ‘theoretical’ and ‘theurgic’. However, this 
more extensive list continues to span the fundamental distinction of section 
66 between virtues of the soul as related to the body and virtues of the soul 
taken in itself: natural, ethical and political virtues concern soul in relation 
to the body, the three higher orders of virtues having to do with soul sepa-
rate from the body. The more extensive list of section 67 also shows that 
Psellos is inspired not only by the accounts of the hierarchy of virtues in 
Plotinus (Enn. 1.2) and Porphyry (Sent. 32), but also by accounts in later 
Neoplatonists in which the hierarchy of virtues was developed further, in 
particular by Iamblichus, in a work On the Virtues (no longer extant) which 
Psellos seems to be using, as well as by Proclus.10 These sources are also 
Psellos’ inspiration for the idea that the hierarchy of virtues constitutes a 
scale of perfection, of ascending degrees of assimilation to God (sections 
71–72). The highest degree of assimilation of soul as separate is reached in 
theurgic virtue, whereas the highest degree of assimilation of soul as related 
to body is reached in ‘political’ virtue: 
For God says in the gospels ‘If thou wilt separate the precious from the vile, thou shalt 
be as my mouth’ [Jer. 15:19]: you see how He placed the most true [i.e. highest] as-
similation in theurgy. But we would be well content if we were able to order ourselves 
through the political virtues.11 
It will be of use to look a little more at the more modest (human) degree of 
assimilation represented by the level of ‘political’ virtue, as described in the 
sections on the virtues in De omnifaria doctrina, before coming back to the 
Chronographia. 
In section 72, ascribing to Plato the idea that political virtues lead man to 
God as assimilating man to God to the extent possible, Psellos describes 
God in terms of a double activity: the knowledge of the principles of things 
prior to creation, and providence or care exercised in respect to lower 
things. For man, as imitating God (72.5–7), this means, (i) in the political 
                                                           
10 Phil. min. II 32, 111.17–19. An overview of the Neoplatonic theory of the hierarchy of 
virtues can be found in O’Meara (2003: 40–49) (with further references).  
11 De omn. doctr. 71.11–15; see Phil. min. II 32, 111.13–16. In the passage I quote Psellos 
gives the Neoplatonic hierarchy of virtues a biblical authority. An adequate answer to the 
question as to how Psellos may have sought to integrate the Neoplatonic virtues with 
Christian virtues would require an extensive investigation which cannot be attempted here.  
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virtues, turning to the things of this world and ordering ‘those’ who are infe-
rior by means of the virtues that produce moderation of the passions (µε-
τριοπάθεια) and, (ii) in the theoretical or contemplative life, ascending to 
the principles of all things.12 The moderation of the passions finds more de-
tailed expression in sections 75–80 where Psellos summarizes the doctrine 
of moral virtues as means between the extremes of excess and deficiency of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book II. He then connects this in section 81 
to the psychology and virtues of Book IV of Plato’s Republic. In other 
words, Psellos interprets Aristotle’s doctrine of moral virtue as relating to 
the (Neo-)Platonic doctrine of political virtue. However, in speaking of 
these virtues, Psellos names them ‘ethical’ as concerning the acquiring by 
the irrational part of soul, from reason, of a quality of ethos (81.1–3). We 
need then to distinguish between the ‘political’ virtues, also called ‘ethical’ 
in certain contexts, and the level of virtue subordinate to the political virtues 
in the later Neoplatonic hierarchy of virtues, also called ‘ethical’ (as noted 
above), but which merely concerns moral habituation, for example in chil-
dren and animals, without the contribution of reason (67.2–3). 
In referring to the providential function of political virtues in ordering 
‘those’ who are inferior, Psellos seems to have in mind the ‘outer’ republic, 
the sphere in which humans live in a political community. However, if we 
examine Psellos’ Neoplatonic sources, we can observe that political order is 
the extension to others of the ‘inner’ republic, the ordering of the soul’s life 
in relation to the body, an ordering that can extend first to the domestic 
sphere and then to the political. Thus the distinction between the sciences of 
ethics, economics (domestic life) and politics, in the Aristotelian division of 
the sciences adopted by the later Neoplatonists, is a distinction merely in 
quantity, the same ‘political’ virtues obtaining in the individual, in the 
household and in the state.13 And the root of good order as extended to oth-
ers is the order in the ‘inner’ republic of the soul.14 
 
III 
We may come back now to the Chronographia. It has been noted that 
Psellos’ history of Byzantine emperors is to a large extent an account of the 
ethos of these rulers and, to a lesser extent, of those who shared in their rule 
                                                           
12 72.7–12. On µετριοπάθεια (of Aristotelian origin) in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of 
virtues, see Hadot (1978: 150–61). 
13 See O’Meara (2003: 56). 
14 See O’Meara (2003: 45). For the inner and outer republic in Psellos, see below section V. 
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as advisors, ministers, relations, rivals, the account of their ethos serving to 
situate policies, actions and reactions to events.15 It has also been pointed 
out that part of the background to Psellos’ history is provided by the rhetori-
cal theory and practice of royal panegyric, in which certain moral qualities 
(for example, φιλανθρωπία) are standardly attributed to the ruler to be 
praised.16 However it is also clear that Psellos wishes in general to distin-
guish between his history and the writing of panegyrics, and his moral por-
traits of rulers mix praise and blame, presenting a serious of variously con-
trasting combinations of virtues and vices. His approach evokes an 
influential precedent, that set by Plutarch’s Parallel Lives with its edifi-
catory tales of differing and contrasting moral characters and fates. 
Plutarch’s work is probably also in the background to Damascius’ Philoso-
phical History (or Life of Isidore), where the Neoplatonist philosopher of 
the early sixth century presents an edificatory panorama of the contrasting 
moral characters and fates of a wide range of philosophers of late antiq-
uity.17 Damascius’ work, portions of which are preserved in Photios’ Biblio-
theca and in the Suda, has the particularity of structuring the series of mini-
biographies which it includes so as to illustrate in different ways the hierar-
chy of virtues of later Neoplatonism. Thus some individuals manifest certain 
natural virtues (or vices) and not others (for example, health, good mem-
ory); some display some ethical virtues (or vices) and not others; some 
reach the political virtues; and a few go even further, ascending the scale to 
the higher virtues, purificatory, contemplative and theurgic. Damascius’ ac-
count concerns private persons, rather than rulers (although he does include 
some rulers), and it shows how different natural virtues or vices can develop 
into ethical virtues and vices and into political virtues affecting the lives of 
their possessors. I believe we can detect something comparable in Psellos’ 
Chronographia: if the series of biographies concern those in power or asso-
ciated with power, they often illustrate, not so much the rhetorical conven-
tions concerning the virtues of the ideal ruler, as a conception of different 
types of virtue and vice, as these concern rulers, a conception which may be 
fitted into the theory of the hierarchy of virtues we have found mentioned in 
the Chronographia and explained in some detail in the De omnifaria 
doctrina.18 The following examples might be given in support of this 
suggestion. 
                                                           
15 See for example Gadolin (1970); Kaldellis (1999). 
16 Pietsch (2005). See Angelov (2007) for this theme in later Byzantine thought. 
17 See O’Meara (2006) on what follows. 
18 I do not wish to claim that Psellos here is directly inspired by Damascius’ work. 
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At the inception of his reign the emperor Basil II was leading a dissolute, 
pleasure-seeking life, Psellos reports (I 4.5–13), in other words a life of im-
moderation, comparable to the lowest human life, a life subject to passions, 
which we have met already in Psellos’ tripartition of the moral lots of the 
soul. However, Basil’s character and way of life changed on his acceding to 
power: he became tough, rigorous, disciplined, an effective ruler (I 4 and 
18). This means, I suggest, that Psellos considers Basil to have developed 
the equivalent of ‘ethical’ virtue, i.e. a virtue acquired for example by ani-
mals and children through training and not through reason which is part of 
the virtue next in the hierarchy, ‘political’ virtue. For it is the pressure of 
events (πράγµατα) that changed Basil’s character (I 4.7–8). That Basil’s 
rigour was not true political virtue is suggested also by his autocratic ap-
proach to ruling, his refusal to take advice (a failing in Psellos’ eyes, as we 
will see), his attending, not to the written laws, but to the unwritten laws of 
his own naturally well-endowed (εὐφυεστάτη) soul (I 29.9–11). Basil may 
then have had great military success and accumulated riches, much to the 
material advantage of his empire, but he ruled, we may conclude, on the ba-
sis of his natural virtues and of ethical virtues imposed by the constraint of 
events, not on that of political virtue. Basil’s brother and successor 
Constantine VIII was also immoderately given to the life of pleasure (ἀπό-
λαυσις), possessing natural strength of body, but too old to change in char-
acter as had his brother (II 1–2). Constantine was succeeded by his son-in-
law, Romanos III, whom Psellos characterizes as falsely pretending to have 
knowledge which, had it been genuine, would have been beneficial to all (III 
4.5–6). Another pseudo-virtue in Romanos was the piety inspiring excessive 
expenditures on Church building, an appearance of piety denounced by 
Psellos as also false, since it involved much injustice and the ruin of the 
body politic (III 15.8–11). With this exaggerated show of imperial piety 
Psellos contrasts the true piety of the intellect clothed in divinity, the soul 
stained in the purple of intellective royalty, i.e. proportion in action and 
measure in thought.19 Here also we cannot speak of genuine political virtue. 
Michael IV cuts a much better figure: his character was ordered, reason 
dominated his passions and he emerges as a good ruler. Yet here again, it 
was his natural qualities and the demands of rule, rather than an appropriate 
moral education, which gave him his virtues (IV 7.6–10; 8.6; 9; 11.8–10). 
At the end of his life Michael turned to another, higher life, that directed to 
God (IV 52–53). 
                                                           
19 III 15.18–20. See Kaldellis (1999: 72–74), for useful indications concerning Psellos’ 
Neoplatonic sources on this subject. 
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Considered in the light of the theory of the hierarchy of virtues, we can 
say that these lives of the emperors describe a variety of natural qualities 
and defects of soul and body, natural virtues and vices.20 From these can 
develop ethical vices or virtues, immoderation in the passions or disciplined 
dispositions. However if such ethical virtues develop, it is due, not to an ap-
propriate education and to reason, but to the pressures brought by rule. False 
versions of virtues occur as does false knowledge. Genuine knowledge is 
generally lacking as is, I think we can infer, genuine political virtue. If em-
perors are nonetheless successful, it is due to their natural endowments and 
ethical virtues imposed by the harsh lessons of political reality. Psellos’ dif-
ferentiated appreciation of these emperors contrasts with the accounts which 
come at the end of the Chronographia, where Psellos follows more and 
more the standard rhetorical practice of imperial panegyric.21 
 
IV 
What then is the ethos of the truly good ruler, in Psellos’ eyes? It seems to 
follow from the theory of the hierarchy of virtues that such a ruler should 
possess ‘political’ virtue, both within, in his soul, and without, as it applies 
to his function as ruler. Rule, Psellos assumes, is monarchic in form and has 
as its aim the good of the monarch’s subjects, promoting lawfulness, justice, 
moderation.22 The ‘good’ in question relates, we can assume, to the subjects 
as humans, i.e. as souls living in relation to the body, as distinct from higher 
goods attained by soul separate from the body through the higher stages of 
the hierarchy of virtues. Psellos compares the monarch to Plato’s demiurge, 
i.e. the divine world-maker in Plato’s Timaeus who brings order to disorder, 
imposing cosmic harmony, justice, equality.23 However, the human mon-
arch is not a god, Psellos insists. He complains in particular of rulers who 
claim to have the highest wisdom and highest virtues and who are only 
satisfied if they rule as gods rule (VI 74.15–20). Such rulers would rather 
die than have recourse to the support of collaborators providing them with 
God-sent help (20–25). We can discern here Psellos’ critical attitude to the 
persistence in Byzantium of Roman imperial divinization.24 His criticism 
                                                           
20 For further references to these natural or innate virtues in the Chronographia, see 
Kaldellis (1999: 24–25). 
21 For the last part of the work (VII a–VII c) as added later, see Pietsch (2007: 111–12) 
(with references to earlier studies). 
22 Chron. IV 47.3–4; VII a 2 and 15. 
23 Chron. VII 62.6–9. 
24 But compare the change in the last part of the Chronographia (VII c 1.12–13: on Michael 
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involves a distinction between divine and human rule. Divine rule can be 
absolute, requiring no collaboration, being based on divine power, knowl-
edge and virtue. However, human rulers are not so qualified: their medioc-
rity as regards knowledge and virtue is made all too evident in Psellos’ por-
traits.25 They must rule as humans; they require the assistance of advisors 
and experts in various fields; their rule, at best, will reach the level of ‘po-
litical’ virtue. 
This is the point which Psellos makes in the passage of the Chrono-
graphia concerning the differing conditions and lots of the soul with which 
our study began. The context of this passage is the criticism of Leo Para-
spondylos, the man the empress Theodora put in charge of government.26 
This man, in Psellos’ view, was lacking in ‘political’ virtue, in political 
ethos (VI a 6.13–7.3). He was rough, unsociable, difficult to approach. His 
rigour, Psellos feels, is a virtue appropriate to eternity, but not to time; 
impassibility and inflexibility belong to another world, not to this world, to 
this life, a life related to the body, which is ‘more political’, adjusted to 
present circumstances, where soul relates to the passions (7.9–16). It is 
precisely at this point that Psellos introduces his distinction between the 
divine life (soul separate from body) and the human life of soul related to 
the body which may be ‘political’, as moderate, or dissolute, as given to the 
passions. Psellos criticizes the confusion which consists in applying moral 
dispositions appropriate to the divine life to the conduct of human affairs 
(8.18–24). In other words, in terms of the theory of the hierarchy of virtues, 
the virtues of soul separate from the body are appropriate for the divine life, 
not for human bodily existence, where the relevant desirable virtues are the 
‘political’. Rule exercised by humans over humans requires human virtue 
which includes flexibility and accommodation of the passions which are part 
of soul’s life with the body. 
One might doubt that Psellos’ critique goes as far as assuming that Leo 
Paraspondylos actually attained divine virtues and lived a divine life. The 
impression given of Leo is far from flattering and Psellos’ tone is ironic. 
What is at issue is Leo’s autocratic, unsociable inflexibility. These charac-
teristics may evoke divine virtues, but it does not follow from this that Leo 
actually possessed these virtues. It is more likely that they were, for Psellos, 
                                                                                                                                                      
VII). 
25 Psellos’ account of the deficiencies of rulers does not warrant Kaldellis’ inference (1999: 
51) that Psellos thought that these deficiencies were desirable. 
26 My interpretation of this passage differs from that offered by Kaldellis (1999: 155ff.), 
which I believe to be misled, in particular in that it does not take account of the Neoplatonic 
theory in the background of the passage. 
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pseudo-forms of such virtues. A little later (VI a 18), Psellos attacks monks, 
the ‘Naziraeans’, who behave as if they were demigods, who pretend to 
model their lives on the divine, but who do not in fact do this, while throw-
ing into confusion the natural, corporeal order of human life. Such monks 
thus represent a double perversion: the confusion of the divine and human 
levels of existence (with their appropriate virtues); and the false pretence to 
divine virtues which they are far from possessing. 
A good ruler ought to aim at ruling on the basis of ‘political’ virtue. Such 
a ruler also requires the collaboration of others, of advisors and experts in 
various fields. We might explain this requirement in Psellos by saying that 
one would need to be a god not to need such collaboration and that, in 
Psellos’ experience, the mediocrity of the rulers he describes, mediocrity in 
knowledge and virtue, demands recourse to others who might dispose of the 
requisite political knowledge and virtue and compensate for the deficiencies 
of the ruler.27 Thus we sometimes meet in the Chronographia, in the entou-
rage of the ruler, competent specialists, good generals, administrators, jud-
ges, men naturally talented and possessing expertise in rhetoric and law, 
having practical intelligence in relation to public affairs, representing the 
desirable political virtues, men such as Constantine Leichoudes (VI 178) 
and, we can safely assume, Psellos himself. 
There is an exception to this, but a revelatory one. In the panegyric of 
Michael VII in the final part of the Chronographia (VII c 4), Psellos refers 
to the diversity of fields of specialization (kingship, philosophy, rhetoric, 
music, astronomy, geometry, logic, physics), each with its particular 
subject-areas and corresponding experts. So great a ruler was Michael VII, 
however, that he mastered all fields, he was, mirabile dictu, a specialist in 
everything! Perhaps Psellos’ De omnifaria doctrina deserves some credit for 
this surprising omni-competence. We may also suspect that Psellos, too, 
considered himself a specialist in many fields, if not in all, able to outshine 
many an expert. However, strictly speaking, the claim that the emperor was 
a specialist in everything makes no sense outside the imaginary world of 
imperial panegyric. Psellos himself reminds us implicitly, in his account of 
technical and scientific specialization, of the principle of specialization in 
Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s Republic, humans, having diverse talents, 
function best in developing their specific expertises in collaboration, those 
best suited to rule ruling, those best suited for auxiliary or productive tasks 
                                                           
27 There may have been in the distant past perfect rulers such as Numa Pompilius, as he is 
described in Psellos’ (?) Historia syntomos 2 (cf. O’Meara 2003: 79 n. 21 for Julian the 
Emperor’s use of the figure of Numa as a Pythagorean philosopher-king). 
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assuming these functions. Ruling expertise is referred to in Plato’s States-
man as the ‘royal’ science. Like the ‘political’ science of Aristotle’s Nico-
machean Ethics (I 1), this science is ‘architectonic’, i.e. it commands and 
uses subordinate sciences such as rhetoric and military science (Statesman 
303e–305d). 
In view of the ruler’s need to use specialists in the various fields con-
cerned by his rule, we may wonder in consequence if there is a specific ex-
pertise in ruling, a royal or political science corresponding to political vir-
tue. And what, we may also ask, is the role of the philosopher in relation to 
such a ruling science? In the reality of Psellos’ history it seems clear that, in 
general, the rulers have neither the requisite political virtue nor the requisite 
political science. They must rely on advisors such as Psellos, a philosopher 
who advises Michael VI, for example, on how to govern as monarch (VII 
39.8). However, for a fuller treatment of Psellos’ understanding of the phi-
losopher’s position as regards political rule and of his views on political sci-
ence, we need to leave the Chronographia and look elsewhere in his works. 
While not hoping to provide here, in the final part of this paper, anything 
like an exhaustive study of these questions, I would like to draw attention to 




The first text is a speech (Or. min. 8) given on the occasion of Psellos’ de-
clining of the rank of πρωτοασηκρῆτις, or Imperial Secretary. The editor 
of the text suggests a date of c. 1055 for the speech, which would then 
situate it in the difficult period when Psellos found himself obliged to 
withdraw from the imperial court and retire to a monastery (1054: Chron. 
VI 191–99). Indeed we can detect in the speech a bitterness felt at a time 
when things ran contrary to Psellos’ ambition to combine philosophy and 
politics, leading him to retire to the higher life of philosophy, a life which 
only a sorceress, he claims (219), could make him leave. The text, in 
expressing Psellos’ frustrated ambitions, is a statement of these ambitions 
and thus of how he himself saw his mission as a philosopher involved in 
politics. I will summarize in what follows the main ideas Psellos introduces 
in this regard. 
Psellos begins his discourse with the sages of old who attributed little 
importance, he says, to political affairs (πράγµατα), giving priority to the 
ordering of the ‘inner nature’ (5), i.e. the inner republic of the soul as com-
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pared to the external political order. However, not all of these sages aban-
doned material existence for the transcendent realm of pure form, since 
some of them, as Psellos describes them, starting above, from this realm, 
ordered, by reason (λόγῳ), affairs here below: ‘For the philosopher is not 
to despair of political affairs, but is to go to them with reason,’ for these af-
fairs relate to body and require soul as a form to remove from them their 
inherent tendency to dispersal (13–17). As examples of such philosophers 
Psellos names Pythagoras and Socrates, the one honouring Italian laws, the 
other Attic laws (18–19). The examples of Plato and Aristotle are developed 
in more detail: Plato, who composed in discourse the best republic and who 
attempted in Sicily to bring about a change from tyranny to lawful authority, 
in vain (20–28); Aristotle, who educated Alexander, correcting the ethos of 
his soul through philosophy (30), accompanying him on his military expe-
ditions and even instructing him in the details of military science!28 
This ancient order, where philosophy brought reason to individual lives, 
where all shared in intelligence and grace (69–73), is now reversed (73ff.), 
Psellos laments: what is base is exalted and philosophy is despised (99). 
Psellos then comes (121ff.) to his own case. He describes himself as having 
attempted, from his youth, to join the two ways, the higher and the lower, 
the way of philosophy and that of political affairs, not closeting himself as a 
philosopher in the isolation of a small house,29 nor abandoning his books for 
judicial occupations, but keeping the philosophers’ books at hand as he in-
volved himself in politics, being consequently admired both by philosophers 
and by politicians (121–34). This mixed life is described then by Psellos as 
a combining of philosophy with rhetoric (136ff.), Socrates and Pythagoras 
combined with Demosthenes (185–86), which gives Psellos the opportunity 
to describe his work with the various branches and authors (including 
Proclus) in philosophy and in rhetoric. The speech ends with the breakdown 
of his attempt to mix philosophy and politics. Having been weighed down 
by political affairs and filled with earthly afflictions, having contemplated 
the transcendent pure light of philosophy, he will not willingly descend 
from this to earthly matters (211–19). 
My brief paraphrase of ideas presented in Psellos’ speech may suffice to 
indicate his perception of himself as philosopher and politician. He clearly 
privileges philosophy as a life transcending the body, a pure intelligible ex-
                                                           
28 The editor (Littlewood) aptly comments in his apparatus fontium: ‘perverse meminerat 
Psellus quae in libello Asclepiodoti vel … Aeliani vel Arriani de re militari legerat.’ 
29 The editor rightly notes here a phrase taken from Demosthenes Or. 18, 97. Psellos’ atti-
tude might also evoke that of Themistius in relation to the closeted philosophers of the 
Iamblichean school (Or. 26, 122.3–6; 130.12). 
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istence in which the soul can share. But as a philosopher he also has distin-
guished predecessors in the attempt to bring reason, λόγος, to the ordering 
of bodily existence, in particular in politics. The philosopher should care for 
politics, even if it is not of primary importance to him. This involvement 
took the form in particular in Psellos of the mixed life, combining philoso-
phy and rhetoric. However, Psellos now feels that this is no longer possible 
and that retirement from political affairs is necessary. 
 
VI 
What λόγος should the philosopher bring to politics, to the political order-
ing of bodily existence? We may suppose that this λόγος will be a political 
wisdom or science correlative to political virtue. How then does Psellos 
conceive of such a political science? The second text I would like to intro-
duce provides some indications concerning Psellos’ conception of political 
science, which I will summarize here briefly. 
The work (Phil. min. I 2) is untitled, but has to do with the superior value 
of philosophy, its unity and its division into various branches according to 
various criteria dividing these branches and determining their relative value. 
Thus sciences are distinguished and placed in a hierarchy of value in terms 
of their differing subject-matters, their accuracy, their different finalities 
(12ff.). Among the sciences making up philosophy Psellos mentions the ‘art 
[τέχνη] of political affairs’ (42–43). The primary division of philosophy is 
made in terms of the division of reality into the corporeal and the incorpo-
real (49–54), in each division of which are grouped a number of sciences. In 
the higher division, that dealing with the incorporeal, we find the more de-
monstrative sciences, those treating of intellect, of soul. And in the lower 
division, that relating to corporeal things, are found disciplines which are 
less scientific, working with likelihoods (εἰκοτολογούµεναι), those dealing 
with nature (60, i.e. physics and its branches) and, inferior to these, those 
concerning themselves with ‘political themes’ (πολιτικὰς ὑποθέσεις), the 
legislative (νοµοθετική), the judicial (δικαστική) and rhetoric (61–62).30 
While stressing the inferior scientific status and subject-matter of these latter 
disciplines, Psellos develops especially in what follows (67ff.) a comparison 
between the relative value of legislative and judicial knowledge as com-
pared to rhetoric. If we recall that in Psellos’ later Neoplatonic sources po-
litical philosophy is understood as constituted of legislative and judicial sci-
                                                           
30 In the Athens colloquium it was noted that Psellos here appears to include rhetoric in 
philosophy. 
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ence, an idea going back to Plato’s Gorgias (464b),31 then we can see that 
the comparison Psellos makes between legislative and judicial knowledge, 
on the one hand, and rhetoric, on the other, is a comparison between politi-
cal philosophy and rhetoric.  
In some respects rhetoric claims superiority to the two other forms of 
knowledge, in Psellos’ account, and in some respects it is found to be infe-
rior to them. Rhetoric affirms its superiority, on the one hand, in terms of its 
ability to unify and give form to matters that are infinitely dispersed in leg-
islative science (69–71), a dispersal compared to the dismemberment of 
Osiris (101–3). Rhetoric, its representative would argue, is a legislation to 
itself (αὐτονοµοθεσία) and does not require the two others, whereas they 
are in need of it (76–84). On the other hand, rhetoric is inferior to legislative 
knowledge (including the judicial) in that rhetoric is concerned with words 
rather than with the truth and the beneficial, whereas the legislative provides 
laws and the judicial gives rational order (λόγον) to these, correcting the 
confusion of life and structuring the mores (ἤθη) of the populace (84–88).32 
However, being the lowest branches of philosophy, being concerned with 
lowly things, not being able to produce the assimilation to God achieved by 
philosophy,33 the legislative and judicial are neglected by philosophers (88–
96). Psellos deplores this neglect and ends his text with the suggestion that 
if someone with a scientific disposition had unified these forms of knowl-
edge, making them harmonious, he would have produced, as Plato’s demi-
urge did with the cosmos in the Timaeus (30b5–c1), a most beautiful crea-
ture on earth (97–101).34 
 From this we can conclude that, in Psellos’ view, the current importance 
of rhetoric is relative to the scientifically ruinous state of legislative and ju-
dicial knowledge (i.e. political philosophy), in relation to which rhetoric is 
in principle, however, inferior. Legislative and judicial knowledge, although 
the lowest parts of philosophy, require the attention of the philosopher who 
will give them scientific order. If not actually divinizing man, as do more 
                                                           
31 See O’Meara (2003: 56–57); O’Meara (2004: 115) (Eustratios of Nicaea). Later Neo-
platonists, inspired by Plato’s Statesman, also spoke of political philosophy as a ‘royal 
science’ (O’Meara 2003: 58; 94; 210), as does Psellos (see Angelov’s contribution to the 
present volume). Psellos speaks of ‘political philosophy’ (πολιτικὴ φιλοσοφία) in Epist. 
ad Cerul. 127–28. As was indicated to me at the Athens colloquium, a βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη 
is mentioned as being what Numa Pompilius’ Muse teaches him, according to Psellos (?), 
Historia syntomos 2 (the source seems to be Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 2.60.5, 
who speaks of a βασιλικὴ σοφία).  
32 For Neoplatonic sources for this, see O’Meara (2003: 56–58). 
33 See above section II. 
34 On the demiurgic image, see also above section IV. 
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especially the higher branches of philosophy, they can at least achieve an 
ethical ordering of the population in its earthly existence. 
 
VII 
More research would certainly help to develop a fuller account than what is 
offered here. However, the above has perhaps gone some way in showing 
the following. The Chronographia refers to quite specific and elaborate 
philosophical theories for which we find a fuller explanation elsewhere, for 
example the theory of the hierarchy of virtues which is introduced and used 
in the Chronographia and described at length in De omnifaria doctrina. We 
thus have the possibility of better understanding the philosophical theories 
present in the Chronographia if we take account of Psellos’ philosophical 
works and of the sources inspiring these works.35 Psellos’ position, both in 
the Chronographia and in the various other works we have considered, is 
fairly coherent and constant. A fundamental reference point throughout 
these texts is the distinction between incorporeal and corporeal existence, as 
this affects the human condition and the conduct of life. The incorporeal is 
preferred by the philosopher: it provides a higher life, concerns the soul 
alone, represents assimilation to the divine, the goal of philosophy, which, 
in philosophy, is found in the higher orders of the virtues and in the higher 
sciences. Psellos distinguishes this higher life from its counterfeits, in par-
ticular the sham divine life of certain monks. Corporeal existence represents 
a lower life, the life of soul in the body, a human life, which may be lived 
by bringing reason and order to bodily affairs (the ‘political’ life or ‘politi-
cal’ virtue), or by allowing oneself to be dominated by the passions in a dis-
solute life. Without denying the higher, divine life, Psellos places consider-
able emphasis, in a way that is quite distinctive of him, on the mixed or in-
termediary life of political virtue, both as regards himself as well as regards 
his action in political affairs.36 As a philosopher he finds models in antiquity 
                                                           
35 It is on these grounds that I do not think that Kaldellis (1999) proves his thesis that 
Psellos is anti-Neoplatonic. Kaldellis argues, for example, that Psellos’ reference to the 
Epinomis (991e) in the Chronographia (VI 39) supports this thesis, given the main doctrine 
of the Epinomis. However, we should notice that the same passage of the Epinomis is 
referred to in a similar context by one of Psellos’ favourite authors, Proclus (In Eucl. I 
42.11–12; see also Iamblichus, De comm. math. sc. 21.18–29; 31.8–12) and I think few 
would be willing to argue from this that Proclus is anti-Neoplatonist. See also above n. 25. 
36 Psellos’ emphasis on his middle position has been recently discussed by Jenkins (2006: 
133; 143–44) and Delli (2007). Compare Criscuolo’s emphasis on Psellos’ ‘humanism’ (in 
his edition of Psellos, Epist. ad Xiphil. 31–43) ; this ‘humanism’, in Psellos’ case, should be 
understood in the light of the concept of the ‘human’ and of human virtue indicated above 
section II; see O’Meara (2010). 
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for his ambition to bring reason, scientific order, to the ‘outer republic’, that 
of political power in Byzantium, by combining the ‘ways’ of philosophy 
and of rhetoric, in particular the lower branches of philosophy appropriate 
for this, the legislative and judicial, scientifically reformed and combined 
with rhetoric. Psellos’ development of this combination of ways is again 
quite distinctive and reminiscent in some respects of Themistius.37 In the 
monarchical system in which Psellos lived, the monarch, far from possess-
ing the perfect knowledge and virtue of divinity, often fell short—the 
Chronographia shows this in detail—of political virtue and knowledge and 
reached, at best, the lower level of ‘ethical’ virtue. Such monarchs conse-
quently required, in compensation, advisors and administrators possessing 
the necessary political virtues and competences. Psellos saw for himself no 
mean role in this context, all the more so as he attributed to himself a wide 
range of such competences. What could at best be achieved would be the 
material well-being of the Empire and ethical order in its population. How-
ever the story Psellos has to tell in the Chronographia is often enough that 
of incompetent and/or dissolute rulers and their inadequate staff, who 
brought ruin to their subjects. Psellos himself might sometimes be forced to 
take refuge, to retire to the higher life of the philosopher, but one cannot but 
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